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BOOK REVIEWS
The Epistemology of Religious Experience, by Keith Yandell. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. viii + 371. $55 (cloth).
RICHARD M. GALE, University of Pittsburgh.
In this book, Yandell joins the growing ranks of contemporary philosophers,
most notably Swinburne, Wainwright, Gutting and Alston, who defend the
cognitivity of religious experience by appeal to an a priori principle of
evidence or prima facie experiential justification that is supposed to hold for
both sense and religious experience. But, strange to say, their views are
completely neglected in this book. This is unfortunate because there are
numerous places where their writings would have helped to motivate, enrich,
and probe the discussion. For example, the total omission of Alston's doxastic
practice based defense of cognitivity results in Yandell's attacking a straw man
version of this approach (on 205-212) based on a crude, redneck practice (of
the sort practiced by Dolly Parton, we are told) in which there are no defeaters
or overriders. 1 Alston and Wainwright go to great pains to show that there
are sophisticated extant versions of these practices within the great mystical
traditions that are worthy candidates for being reliable objective practices.
By ignoring their work he places himself outside of the main loop of the
on-going discussion. This will result in his book not receiving the attention
it deserves,
The organization of the book leaves much to be desired. After an Introduction, in which he summarizes the book and justifies his subjection of religious
claims to the court of rational adjudication, and a chapter on "Religious
experience, 'East' and 'West''' that botanizes the major types of religious
experiences in a Zaehner-like manner, he presents his argument for the cognitivity of theistic type religious experiences based on certain principles of
evidence. The next seven chapters engage in a rear-guard defense of this
conclusion against various objections. He then returns in Chapters 10-12 to
his Chapter 2 argument for cognitivity, developing the very same argument,
only now with more detail and in a dialectical manner that grows out of C.
D. Broad's argument for cognitivity based on agreement among mystics and
C. B. Martin's objection that there are no tests for the veridicality of their
experiences. This is followed by two more chapters of rear-guard action. This
mode of organization creates much repetition and burdens the reader with
having to thumb back and forth between Chapters 2 and 10-12. He would
have done better had he presented his argument for cognitivity up-front in a
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continuous manner after an historical lead-in through the work of his fellow
contemporary defenders of cognitivism, rather than Broad and Martin, whose
work is of only of historical interest at best, and then went on to the rear-guard
defense. This review will follow this preferred order.
Yandell is seeking a conceptually true principle of evidence that will render
religious experiences of seeming to experience God evidence for God's existence and his being as he appeared to be in the experience. For such a
principle to be acceptable, it must be restricted to experiential seemings that
(1) are intentional and (2) allow for the possibility of their veridicality being
challenged or defeated. After careful scrutiny, Yandell's account of each of
these restrictions will be found wanting, and an attempt will then be made to
supply a more adequate account, the upshot of which will be that religious
experiences are not cognitive.
(l) An intentional experience has what Yandell calls a subject-consciousnessobject structure (sco) in which the seeming or phenomenological object can exist
even when the subject does not. "An item A is an object relative to person 5
if and only if 5 does not exist, by itself or conjoined to a set of truths, does
not entail A does not exist" (34). The sco experience contrasts with the
subject-content experience (sc) in that the latter takes a cognate accusative
that indicates an aspect of the experience, "5 feels painfully (or pains)" being
the conspicuous adverbial (or cognate accusative) analysis of "5 feels a pain."
Yandell's next task is to show that religious experiences have the needed
sea structure. Yandell contends that theistic religious experiences, such as a
numinous experience of a majestic, living, holy being of immense power,
have this structure. "Such an experience will seem to its subject to be an
experience of God; its accurate phenomenological description will require
the use of the term 'God' (or some referential equivalent)" (16-7). This
account fails to take note of the fact that "It phenomenologically seems to 5
that _ _ " is opaque in that the principle of substitutivity of coreferential
expressions or sentences with the same truth-value does not hold salva veritate. Assuming that God is identical with St. Anselm's favorite object, it is
possible that it phenomenologically seem to S that 5 is experiencing God but
not phenomenologically seem to 5 that 5 is experiencing St. Anselm's favorite
object. The same counter-example can be given to the claim that "Every
description of a religious experience can be transformed into a phenomenological description by the simple device of making a description of how
things are into a description of how things seemed to be,,2 (17). This shortcoming in Yandell's account is easily corrected.
There are far more serious problems, however, with Yandell's analysis of
intentionality. Counter-examples can be given to both its necessity and sufficiency. Touching and seeing myself fail to satisfy this analysis, since their
object cannot exist unless I exist, yet plainly they are intentional, being of
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the same sea structure as the admittedly intentional experience of touching
or seeing someone else. Plainly, the possibility of the object existing when
the subject does not should not be a necessary condition. Dancing the waltz,
on the other hand, shows the non-necessity of the analysis, since it admits of
a cognate accusative or adverbial analysis into waltzing or dancing waltzily
even though the waltz (understood either nominalistic ally as waltzings or
platonically as a type of dance) exists independently of both the dancer and
the experience of dancing. This shows that, in general, an experience can
have an se structure even when it has an object that can exist independently
of the subject.
Not only is Yandell's analysis of the sea structure or intentionality flawed,
the manner in which he determines compliant instances is equally disturbing;
for he ultimately leaves it up to the experient, including the religious ex periencer, to determine whether her experience is of the seo structure. He assures
us that "as seems patent from the reports their subject offer, they [religious
experiences] are subject-consciousness-object in structure and seem to be of
a mind-independent object" (262).
The problem with this taking-their-word-for-it approach is that it opens the
door to a mad dog fideism in which whatever someone believes is unchallengeable. There would be no basis for challenging the existentialist who
takes a mood of boredom to be of an objective Nothing or a Reichian who
takes an orgasm to have cosmic significance. It is a very difficult issue to
determine when an experience, in general, is of the sea sort. In some cases,
but not all, there is an ordinary verb or adverb corresponding t.o a cognate
accusative. Whereas we have the linguistic resources to convert "She played
golf' into "She golfed," we do not for "She played tennis"; but, plainly, the
latter also takes a cognate accusative. Furthermore, there is considerable
controversy about how to classify certain experiences. Moore took sensing
to have an objective accusative, Ducasse only a cognate accusative. The
Sellarsian linguistic nominalist, if I may oversimplify, takes "She said that
snow is white" as "She spoke snow-is-white-ly (or snow-is-white-ed),"
the realist as a dyadic relation between the speaker and an abstract proposition. The structure of religious experiences also is subject to philosophical controversy. By taking the religious experiencer's word for it, Yandell
begs the question against his anti-cognitivist opponent. Furthermore,
since, as will be seen, Yandell rejects the universal claim of mystics that
their experience is ineffable, why should he take their word for their
experience having an sco structure. After, discussing Yandell's restriction
(2), some suggestions will be made as to how to understand the seo structure
and thereby resolve this controversy.
(2) What sort of challenges to its veridicality must a sea type experience
E be subject to for E to count as evidence for the proposition, p, that E's
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apparent object exists and is as it appeared to be in E? Yandell provides a
valuable service by laying out for us a wide variety of such veridicality tests
or checks of varying strength. The weakest sort would be that the subject of
E "has no positive reason to suppose that some countervailing factor obtains"
(48). Among these countervailing factors in the case of religious experience can
be an ontological disproof of God's existence, an inductive argument from evil,
or a social scientific argument to show that such experiences are in general
unreliable or that the subject would seem to experience God even if he didn't
exist. A stronger version requires the possibility of having experiences that
challenge or defeat the veridicality of E, with the strongest version requiring
that the challenging experiences be of the very same type as E.
Before proceeding further, a minor unclarity in the account must be resolved. Yandell claims to be unearthing a principle of evidence, but what he
says about what happens to E's evidential status when E's veridicality faces
a successful challenge, a "countervailing factor" in his words, suggests that
it is a principle for being warranted or Justified in believing p, which is
stronger than just having evidence for believing p. Yandell claims at numerous places, with only one exception, that E loses its evidential status when
its veridicality is successfully challenged. "A countervailing factor is any
consideration that would cancel out the evidence" that E supplies for p. (48).
This can't be right, since it has the consequence that it makes sense to speak
of E as prima facie evidence for a belief, a qualification that applies only to
being a warrant or justification for a belief. Yandell gets it right on only one
occasion when he says that "Having evidence that X exists is compatible with
being unreasonable in believing that X exists, for it is compatible with having
stronger experiential (or total) evidence that X does not exist than one has
that X exists" (234). To be sure, we would not be willing to say that E is
evidence for p when we have conclusive or very strong evidence for not-p,
but that is because we would be violating a Gricean conversational implicature requiring us to be as informative as we can be, since saying that E is
evidence for p pragmatically implies that there is a yet to be decisively
defeated reason for believing p. Yandell must either take his principle to be
a principle of warrant for belief or give up his repeated claim that E ceases
to be evidence when successfully challenged.
While Yandell claims that the weakest challengers suffice for the cognitivity of E (48), he must realize that his anti-cognitivist opponent would not
agree; for he subsequently argues that E is subject to stronger challengers,
even the strongest requiring that they involve experiences of the very same
type as E. Herein his argument takes an analogical turn. His opponent grants
that sense experience is cognitive, but these stronger challengers are the very
ones that apply to sense experience, thereby enabling E type experience
analogically to ride the coattails of the latter to cognitive respectability.
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Yandell admits that there are significant dis analogies between the two kind
of experiences. Only sense experience is subject to caused-in-the-right-way
(261) and prediction-falsification tests (264). Furthermore, numinous type
religious experience
lacks publicity and multiple modalities. Unless there are tests that have a
function for numinous experience similar to the epistemological service these
features provide for sensory experience, this dissimilarity will be of negative
relevance to numinous experience as evidence. (265)
In spite of these dissimilarities, the analogy is sufficiently tight because both
admit of an agreement test that also allows for experiential challenges based
on the same type of experience-the strongest challenger.
I believe that Yandell does not realize just how profound the disanalogies
are between the two, so profound that they challenge the alleged sea structure
of religious experience and thus the applicability of his principle of evidence
to them. Whereas the sensory tests based on agreement, prediction, and being
caused-in-the-right-way allow for a distinction to be made between perceptions of numerically one and the same object as opposed to qualitatively
similar objects, the religious experience test based on agreement-disagreement does not. The reason, which I spell out in detail in the writings mentioned in footnote I, is that there is a common space-time receptacle that
houses the sense perceivers and their objects and explains how one and the
same object can be the common object of the perceptions of different observers at one and the same time and the same observer at successive time
by being the common cause of these experiences in virtue of being causally
linked with each of them in the right way; but there is no analogue to this in
the case of religious experience, no analogue to the spatio-temporal receptacle that performs this same service for religious experiences. It is this big
disanalogy that precludes the latter from having the required sea structure,
since there is no ground within religious experiences to draw the needed
numerical-qualitative distinction. Thus it turns out that (1)'s restriction of the
principle of evidence to sea type experiences depends upon (2)'s restriction
to types of experiences for which there are tests for determining when two
or more experiences of that type are of one and the same or only qualitatively
similar objects.
That this cannot be done ultimately undermines Yandell's courageous attempt to show that religious type experiences can challenge the veridicality
of religious experiences. "A numinous (uncanny, majestic, powerful, and
awesome) being need not be holy (not at least in a sense that includes being
righteous or good)" (248). This allows for there to be God-like and demoniclike numinous beings and experiences. The latter experiences are disconfirmatory of the veridicality of the former, assuming God to be essentially good,
in virtue of the principle of "Collegial Disconfirmation," which states that
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"if one finds a being 0* that is very like 0 but that lacks some property
essential to 0, and it is unlikely that both 0 and 0* exist, then one has
evidence that 0 does not grace us by its presence" (247). Demonic numinous
experiences are supposed to disconfirm the veridicality of theistic numinous
experiences in virtue of this principle. But Yandell gives us no reason for
thinking that it is unlikely that a good and bad numinous being coexist. He
writes as if he never read the part of the Bible that deals with the Devil.
There is another way in which demonic numinous experiences could be
seen to be disconfirmatory of theistic ones that does not appeal to the principle of Collegial Disconfirmation. Yandell describes cases in which what
appears to be an instance of the latter turn out to be of the former kind. The
apparent numinous object of the experience, which at first appeared to be
benevolent, turns out to be malevolent, thereby disconfirming the veridicality
of the former experience by showing that one had been initially duped by
this demon (247-8). One problem with these examples is that they beg the
question by assuming that the later numinous experiences are cognitive, but,
for the reasons just given, this is most dubious. Another concerns how it is
to be determined that it is numerically one and the same numinous being
throughout the experience. Is it not just as reasonable (or unreasonable) to
say that both the earlier and later numinous experiences were veridical, because they were of numerically distinct numinous beings? There is no nonarbitrary answer to this question, since, whereas there are sensory criteria for
determining whether you saw the same woman or twins on successive occasions, there are no analogous numinous criteria for determining this with
respect to successive numinous experiences. And since anything goes, nothing goes.
The rear-guard defense occupies the major portion of the book, some nine
chapters, and, for the most part, it fares much better than does his above
argument for the cognitivity of religious experiences. The most radical sort
of challenges to his cognitivity thesis are ontological disproofs of God's
existence. His response is a rehash of the recent literature, except for a very
interesting criticism of the divine simplicity doctrine (336-42). The challenge
presented by social scientific explanations of religious experiences is deftly
met, as is the extreme conceptual relativism of Steven Katz. The claim that
religious experience is self-authenticating is totally demolished, though it is
not made clear why this is a challenge to his brand of cognitivism. Maybe it
is because a type of experience that cannot be unveridical cannot serve as
evidence for the existence of its apparent accusative. The challenge that is
given the most attention is the claim that religious experiences are ineffable
and therefore not capable of serving as evidence, since, according to Yandell,
"experience is evidence only under some description" (9).
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His rear-guard action falters badly, however, when he attempts to neutralize
the challenge of religious di versity consisting in the fact that the claims based
respectively upon theistic and monistic religious experiences are inconsistent,
the former recognizing and the latter denying any type of numerical distinctions or diversity. Whereas Yandell's contemporary cognitivists make lame
attempts at ecumenicalism, he charges the monistic mystic with having "nothing to say in the first place" (313). The reason for this harsh charge is that
the monistic mystical experience is described in contradictory terms, and
"what cannot be expressed without contradiction ... [is] necessarily false"

(312).
While Yandell's I'm-no-Mister-Nice-Guy approach is most refreshing, it
nevertheless is atrocious. It flies in the face of the patent fact that the descriptions given by monistic mystics of their experiences, although syntactically contradictory, are understood, even by the members of the straight
community of non-mystics, although they are unable to give a non-contradictory unpacking of them. There is no doubt that there is a special mystical
way of using language that we have yet to explain. To dismiss mystical claims
as uninformative on the ground that they are contradictory in terms of the
standards or canons of ordinary fact-stating discourse, which is what Yandell
in fact does in Chapter 13, is to judge them by alien standards. I don't have
any explanation of how mystics manage to communicate through the use of
seemingly contradictory utterances, but it is not unreasonable to expect a
book that costs $55 to at least make some start towards finding an explanation, and certainly not to engage in know-nothing dismissiveness.
NOTES
1. In fairness to Yandell, it should be pointed out that Alston's sure-to-become-a-classic
Perceiving God appeared in 1991, probably too late for consideration in his book; but the
articles out of which the book grew, commencing in 1964, appeared early enough. I should
temper my adulation for Alston with the qualification that I do not think his approach
works. For my reasons why see Chapter 8 of my On the Nature and Existence of God,
along with my articles "Why Alston's Mystical Doxastic Practice Is Subjective" and "The
Overall Argument of Alston's Perceiving God," forthcoming respectively in Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research and Religious Studies, along with responses from Alston.
Also to be consulted is my "Swinburne's Argument from Religious Experience," forthcoming in Reason and the Christian Religion, edited by Alan Padgett, from Oxford
University Press.

2. Failure to recognize opaqueness occurs elsewhere, for example, in the claim that "X
exists necessarily if and only if X exists is a necessary truth" (90). This de re-de dicta
confusion faces the same counter-example, if we assume that God necessarily exists.
While it is true that God necessarily exists, it is false that it is necessarily true that St.
Anselm's favorite object exists.

